Introduction
The association between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important one yet, it has come under intense pressure as well as being poorly understood. Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich nation that borders both Iran and Iraq that are under heavy focus on the American foreign policy. In addition, Israel, one of America’s closest allies is also located in this region (Alnasrawi, 1989).
The US-Saudi Arabia trade association has been based on the simple bargain of oil for security. To its end, Saudi Arabia has made sure that it exports its oil to the US at reasonable prices. The main anchor for this association is the ability of Saudi Arabia to maintain oil supply in the market during times of shortages that is hugely beneficial to the US. For instance, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the US, Saudi Arabia augmented shipments of oil to the US to ensure that the world oil prices that had threatened to rise remained stable. In reciprocation, the United States provides Saudi Arabia’s leadership a security cushion that includes a commitment to territorial integrity. Over the years, the US openly guaranteed to assist in the defense of the kingdom from external aggression that included Yemen, Iraq, The Soviet Union, Iran, and Egypt. The deposition of the Iranian Shah in 1979 marked the evolution of this commitment into inherent support for the Saudi leadership against internal problems that include the Al Qaeda network (Dodge, 2008).
The oil for defense description of the US-Saudi Arabia Association is a convincing argument. However, it does not put into consideration the fact that both the US and Saudi Arabia have related strategic interests that have compelled successive Saudi kings and American administrations. The most crucial and commonly assumed aspect of this association was the shared interest to fight the Soviet Union. The US felt that Saudi Arabia was the best-suited ally to join forces with to fight the atheist Soviet Union since it is a kingdom based on strict religious beliefs. The mutual concern by the US and Saudi Arabia about the Soviet Union’s growing worldwide influence that was based on strategic and religious realities provided a protective political layer that covered the oil-defense interests. Consequently, the legacy that remained after this partnership lights up the Middle East (Mason, 2015).
Current Issues
As the US remains pursuant of its war on terror, the integral and hard question of the best policy to adopt concerning Saudi Arabia has emerged. This question is precipitated by the fact that the Cold War justification of the existing association is no longer compelling. New challenges such as counterterrorism, political reform and stability in Iraq are some of the key issues at hand. In the wake of these problems, the US and Saudi Arabia have on occasion offered differing interpretations. The religious attributes that the US once regarded as a strategic asset are now an obvious, controversial and potentially dangerous. The Kingdom provides one of the sternest challenges to the high priority US political reform agenda. This challenge is because Saudi Arabia lags behind on almost all the pointers of political transparency and reform that would positively impact the whole region. However, since the kingdom is important on issues such as oil, stability in Iraq and counterterrorism, the US has limitations on how hard it can put pressure on Saudi Arabia. In addition, the reformers within the kingdom have reservations for a hurried push to realization of reform. This is due to the fears that there will be increased religious radicalism similar to Iran and Algeria and utter chaos similar to Iraq (Prados & Blanchard, 2007).
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has emerged from the impoverished narrow-minded country that American oil companies and diplomats first entered into negotiations with almost 75 years ago. Instead, it has developed into a key regional player and a noteworthy global one that is capable of influencing the price of oil. Nations that have a high oil demand such as China and India now influence Saudi Arabia’s choices as opposed to the US and European markets. The religious tenets that were developed almost 40 years ago, today act as the influential political conveyor belts for Saudi Arabia’s influence throughout the world (Ramady, 2010).
The end of the cold war marked the change in economic, political and geographical conditions for the US and Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the US administration and the Saudi leadership cannot expect the continuation of a similar type of association that was in place for close to a half a century. However, it is still beneficial for both to work together to ensure that their association does not collapse totally, nor becomes too strained that cooperation on the current problems becomes a tall order (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2012).
The 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States has not changed Saudi Arabia’s significant importance in the global arena as well as to the United States. It still retains one of the key sources of the world’s oil reserves, the site of the holiest sites in Islam and the junction of strategic lines of communication between Europe and Asia. However, the attacks impacted negatively on the US- Saudi Association. The fact that Osama Bin Laden and 15 of the hijackers came from Saudi origin and the Saudi Arabia leadership supported the Taliban government in Afghanistan has led to a climate of mistrust and misunderstanding. As a result, the 9/11 attacks have resulted in a debate on whether the future Saudi-US association is sustainable (Huber, 2014).
The strained relations between the two nations can be seen by the differing views on crucial issues. The most notable difference in opinion between the two allies is the conflict in Syria, Iran nuclear program and US policy towards Egypt. It is apparent that the Saudi leadership favors a confrontational approach to deal with Syria and the Iran nuclear program. On the other hand, the US favors negotiated settlements. Saudi leaders have reservations that US- Iran relations could undermine the relationship that exists with the US as well as position Iran as the assertive force in the Gulf region and the Middle East (Krane, 2015).
In terms of trade, Saudi Arabia remained the largest trading partner in the Middle East with exports worth 51.8 billion dollars in 2013.On the other hand, the US exports to Saudi Arabia were worth 18.9 billion dollars. This trade relationship is based on the hydrocarbons the US imports from Saudi Arabia while it exports weapons, machinery, and vehicles. However, the fluctuations that have been noted can be attributed to the deterioration of the value of the Saudi Arabian exports to the United States. The attempts in the US to produce oil domestically have resulted in the decline of oil imports to the US that has exerted downward pressure on international oil prices. Since the major revenue earner in Saudi Arabia is oil exports, these trends have resulted in mild concern from the Saudi leadership. The increasing demand in South and East Asia is projected to compensate for the falling exports to North America in the future. Consequently, the Saudi Arabian government is seemingly committed to maintaining and growing their market share in Asian oil markets (Emery, 2013).
It is evident that the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia share close defense, security and trade ties. This association is, as a result, difficult and costly to pull out of or replace. In addition to this, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has led to new shared risks as well as opportunities for an expansion of the security relations. King Salman has highlighted the shared threat that the Islamic State poses and asked for the US and Saudi Arabia to join forces and deal with it. However, the differences between the preferred modes of action still continue to complicate the bilateral relations on regional security issues (Dalacoura, 2012).
Review of the Trade Policy
In the wake of the strained relations between the US and Saudi Arabia, the US has been presented with a strategic choice to make. The first choice the US can make is by distancing itself from the Kingdom terming it as corrupt, lacking morals, illegitimate and one that cannot be redeemed. The positive consequence of this is that, such a move will earn the United States public relations approval in the region as many will welcome its dissociation. However, on the negative side, the reformists inside the Kingdom will lose any moral standing that they may enjoy the moment. Moreover, if the royal family manages to remain in power, it is highly likely to adopt religiously intolerant policies and bring back the religious channels it was founded on. The main aim is to thwart American interests in the region and beyond. In addition, it is highly likely that Saudi Arabia will look to China for weaponry and China is likely to oblige. The oil prices are also likely to increase, and the American armed forces will be denied efficient transportation routes to the Persian Gulf (Hemmer, 2012).
A second option that the US can employ is to seek a way to engage the royal family to encourage them to implement moderate policies. This option is hard, complicated and has high chances of failure. However, failure will not leave American in a precarious position compared to taking the first option. The engagement of the royal family does not mean that it should be conciliatory. Instead, it is defining the most important aspects and developing appropriate policies around them. One of the vital things that the US needs from Saudi Arabia is for its leaders to check aggressively and close funding channels in Saudi Arabia that underwrite schools, mosques and other institutions that sympathize with and promote intolerance, anti-Americanism xenophobia and xenophobia. Such engagement would provide a weapon for the reformists that are advocating change in the Kingdom (Hemmer, 2012).
The third option is to enact a congressional amendment that denies funding to Saudi Arabia. This amendment will target the 25000 US dollars that the US provides for International Military Education and the Training grant for the Saudi military training. The amendment will look to limit the Saudi military officers from training in the United States and interacting with their American counterparts. This choice is politically popular, but it is counterproductive strategically since it will obstruct Saudi Arabia’s capability to fight against terrorism (Nakhleh, 1975).
The final option that the US can take is non-action. However, such a move greatly undermines the countries in the region that United States to aid. Secondly, it would result in reduced cooperation from Saudi Arabia. In addition, the non-action stance means that the violence in Iraq and Palestine will escalate. The escalation of this violence means that the domestic stability of Saudi Arabia is threatened. Consequently, it would be difficult to persuade the Saudi Arabians into carrying out the controversial actions that the United States desires (Prados & Blanchard, 2007).
Recommendation
The declining strategic ties between the US and Saudi Arabia means there is a need for a rethink of the association between the two nations. The most viable option that the US needs to take is to engage the royal family in adopting moderate policies. In this way, the user will score public relations points in the eyes of the world while at the same time maintaining the close relationship the two countries enjoy in terms of trade. The engagement of the royal family would also mean that the US maintains ongoing negotiations on oil price levels and the price stability. For this reason, the relationship will be defined as a strategic partnership that is based on shared goals rather than a partnership based on common values. If successful, it would also mean that Saudi Arabia becomes stringent on the Saudi-based funding channels to institutions that promote anti-Americanism while the pragmatists clamoring for reform would also gain standing. It is not an easy option to enforce but if implemented but it is best placed to be the basis of the bond as strategic cooperation declines. For this reason, the US-Saudi relationship will be based on trade similar to the relationship with Venezuela and China where the US has formed trading alliances without strategic alliances. This type of association would reflect the realities of the 21st century and enable both nations to move unregulated into the future.
Conclusion
Saudi Arabia still plays a crucial role in the US economy and the global economy as a whole with the role it plays in the oil market. The United States will still require oil from Saudi Arabia in the long term future in the event that its domestic shale oil boom declines after the year 2020 as projected. There is increased trade between the two countries based on the oil partnership. For instance, Saudi Arabia allowed a wide range of American multinationals to engage in joint ventures with local companies in sectors such as energy, petrochemical, manufacturing, telecommunications, and finance. An example of this relationship is accompany called Motiva which is a partnership between Shell Oil company and Saudi Refining Inc which is one of the largest refining and marketing companies in the United States.
Although the greater energy independence has led to the change is strategic structures, Saudi Arabia remains an important player in the world energy market. For this reason, US -Saudi relations still offer a mutually gainful association that is important from an economic, strategic and political angle.
References
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Dodge, T. (2008). US foreign policy in the Middle East (pp. 214-235). Oxford University Press.
Emery, C. (2013). The Oil Kings: How the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. Iranian Studies, 46(5), 834-837.
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Mason, R. (2015). Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East. IB Tauris.
Nakhleh, E. A. (1975). United States and Saudi Arabia: a policy analysis.
Prados, A. B., & Blanchard, C. M. (2007, April). Saudi Arabia: current issues and US relations. Library Of Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service.
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